ALWIE

2008-12-23T11:39:00.000-08:00

Radical Islam vs. Islam

by: David Forte

Islamic radicals hijacked airplanes to attack and undermine the West. They killed thousands of innocents without a single moral qualm. But their enmity is not just directed against us. They also mean to hijack Islam itself and to destroy 13 centuries of Islamic civilization. We are not in a war between two civilizations. We are fighting an enemy of two civilizations.

Osama bin Laden has a strikingly simple and violent conception of the world. It is bipolar. Taking his lead from ancient Islamic legalists who wrote when the world knew nothing but empires, bin Laden divides the earth into the dar al-Islam (the realm of Islam) and the dar al-harb (the realm of war). Between the two there is unceasing conflict.

But for bin Laden, the dar al-Islam is no longer the realm of Islam, or as is sometimes translated, the realm of peace. In common with many Islamic radicals, bin Laden believes that the Islamic world has fallen into perfidy and apostasy. He makes civil war on Islam as much as he makes international conflict with the United States.

He targets moderate Islamic leaders like Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, former Pakistani President Benizir Bhutto, and Jordan King (then Prince) Abdullah. He has no respect for the Saudi government because it permits the stationing of Western troops, contrary to his view of the ancient Shari’a’s prohibition of non-Muslims living on the holy soil of Arabia.

Bin Laden and other Islamic radicals claim they represent ancient Islam. It is true that they do represent one tradition in Islam, but it is a tradition that Islam early on rejected as opposed to the universal message of its Prophet. In the earliest centuries of Islam, a great civil war was fought over who should be the successor to Muhammad. The battle was between the partisans of the assassinated third Caliph, Uthmann, and those who supported the fourth Caliph, ’Ali. This was the conflict that ultimately led to the division between Sunni and Shi’a Islam. But there was a moment when a truce and an arbitration promised a possible peaceful resolution to the conflict.

One group was adamantly opposed to any arbitration and any compromise. Later called the Kharajites, this sect believed that only God could determine who should be the proper successor, and God would let his will be known in battle. The Kharajites withdrew and made war on both factions. They held that any person who strayed from the perfect practice of Islam was ipso facto an apostate and could be killed. And they believed that only they had the true notion of what Islam required. They applied their doctrine with a ferocity against both the developing Sunni and Shi’a traditions of Islam, even assassinating ’Ali. Their tactics were frightfully violent, and it took centuries before they were put down.

Today, radicals like bin Laden replicate that ancient sect that threatened to destroy Islamic civilization at its inception. They copy that sect that stood against what came to be a civilization known in its time for its learning, science, openness and toleration. They engage in tactics that are far beyond what is acceptable in the Islamic moral tradition. They insult the vast multitudes of Muslims who abhor such actions.

Partly because of the timidity of the West, these radicals have gained influence. Some regimes protect them. Some apparently even sponsor them. . Many leaders in the West, bereft of and often hostile to their own Christian roots, have patronizingly assumed that radical violence was an essential part of the Islamic faith. Our own weak responses have helped to legitimate those whom Islam fought so earnestly to rid itself of at its beginning. If we have respect for ourselves, if we have respect for Islam, we can no longer tolerate the evil they represent. Two civilizations hang in the balance.

David F. Forte is a Professor of Law at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law in Cleveland, Ohio and the author of Islamic Studies: Classical and Contemporary Applications. He is an Adjunct Fellow of the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs at Ashland University, Ashland, Ohio.

2008-12-23T07:02:00.000-08:00

TENTANG BID’AH

KONSEP AHLUSSUNNAH WAL JAMA’AH - NAHDLATUL ULAMA (ASWAJA - NU)

Karya : Lembaga Dakwah Nahdlatul Ulama (LDNU)

Dinukil oleh : Retno Wahyudiaty, SE.

Bid’ah dalah arti bahasanya adalah sesuatu yang baru yang tidak ada sebelumnya. Allah SWT. berfirman:
Artinya:
“Allah yang menciptakan langit dan bumi”. (al-Baqaarah; 117).

Bi’dah dalam hukum Islam, ialah segala sesuatu yang diada-adakan oleh ulama yang tidak ada pada zaman Nabi SAW.

Timbul suatu pertanyaan:
Apakah segala sesuatu yang diada-adakan oleh Ulama’ yang tidak ada pada zaman Nabi SAW. pasti jeleknya? Jawaban yang benar, belum tentu! Ada dua kemungkinan; mungkin jelek dan mungkin baik.

Kapan bid’ah itu baik dan kapan bid’ah itu jelek? Menurut Imam Syafi’I:
Artinya:
“Bid’ah ada dua, bid’ah terpuji dan bid’ah tercela, bid’ah yang sesuai dengan sunnah itulah yang terpuji, dan bid’ah yang bertentangan dengan sunnah itulah yang tercela”.

Sayyidina Umar Ibnul Khatab, setelah mengadakan shalat tarawih berjama’ah dengan dua puluh raka’at yang diimami oleh sahabat Ubai bin Ka’ab beliau berkata:
Artinya:
“Sebagus bid’ah itu ialah ini”.

Bolehkah kita mengadakan bid’ah?

Untuk menjawab pertanyaan ini, marilah kita kembali kepada hadits Nabi SAW. yang menjelaskan adanya bid’ah hasanah dan bid’ah sayyiah:
Artinya:
“Barang siapa yang mengada-adakan satu cara yang baik dalam Islam maka ia akan mendapatkan pahala orang yang turut mengerjakannya dengan tidak mengurangi dari pahala mereka sedikitpun, dan barang siapa yang mengadakan suatu cara yang jelek maka ia akan mendapat dosa dan dosa-dosa orang yang ikut mengerjakan dengan tidak mengurangi dosa-dosa mereka sedikitpun”.

Apakah yang di maksud dengan segala bid’ah itu sesat dan segala kesesatan itu masuk neraka?
Artinya:
“Semua bid’ah itu sesat dan semua kesesatan itu di neraka”.

Mari kita pahami menurut Ilmu Balaghah:
Setiap benda pasti mempuyai sifat, tidak mungkin ada benda yang tidak bersifat, sifat itu bisa bertentangan seperti baik dan buruk, panjang dan pendek, gemuk dan kurus. Mustahil ada benda dalam satu waktu dan satu tempat mempunyai dua sifat yang bertentangan, kalau dikatakan benda itu baik mustahil pada waktu dan tempat yang sama dikatakan jelek; kalau dikatakan si A berdiri mustahil pada waktu dan tempat yang sama di katakan duduk.

Mari kita kembali kepada hadits:
Artinya:
“Semua bid’ah itu sesat dan setiap kesesatan itu masuk neraka”.

“Bid’ah” kata benda, tentu mempunyai sifat tidak mungkin tidak mempunyai sifat, mungkin bersifat baik dan mungkin bersifat jelek. Sifat tersebut tidak ditulis dan tidak disebutkan dalam hadits di atas; dalam Ilmu Balaghah dikatakan membuang sifat dari benda yang bersifat.
Seandainya kita tulis sifat bid’ah maka terjadi dua kemungkinan: Kemungkinan pertama:
Artinya:
“Semua bid’ah yang baik itu sesat, dan semua yang sesat masuk neraka”.

Hal ini tidak mungkin, bagaimana sifat baik dan sesat berkumpul dalam satu benda dan dalam waktu dan tempat yang sama, hal itu mungkin mustahil. Maka yang bisa di pastikan kemungkinan yang kedua:
Artinya:
“Semua bid’ah yang jelek itu sesat, dan semua kesesatan itu masuk neraka”.

Maka jelek dan sesat paralel tidak bertentangan, hal ini terjadi pula dalam al-Qur’an, Allah SWT. telah membuang sifat kapal dalam firman-Nya:

Artinya:
“Di belakang mereka ada raja yang akan merampas semua kapal dengan paksa”. (al-Kahfi; 79).

Dalam ayat tersebut Allah SWT. tidak menyebutkan kapal baik apakah kapal jelek; karena yang jelek tidak akan diambil oleh raja. Maka lafadh sama dengan tidak disebutkan sifatnya, walaupun pasti punya sifat, ialah kapal yang baik.

2008-08-26T11:19:00.001-07:00

Berbagi Pengalaman dengan Tokoh-tokoh Muslim dari Negeri Sekuler

Jakarta, wahidinstitute.org
Umat Islam di Moro Filipina menderita kemiskinan akibat marginalisasi ekonomi dari pemerintah. “Umat Islam di Moro adalah warga negara kelas dua,” kata Dr. Amina Rasul mantan menteri kabinet Fidel Ramos di Filipina yang menjadi pembicara dalam diskusi bertajuk “Moslems Minority in Secular State: India and Philippine Experiences.

Diskusi ini diselenggarakan the WAHID Institute, Kamis (14/08/08). Hadir narasumber lainnya Dr. Asghar Ali Engineer dari India.

Dalam diskusi yang digelar di auditorium Wahid Institute ini, Amina memaparkan pengalaman kaum Moro, sebagai representasi Islam, di Filipina. Direktur Philippine Council on Islam and Democracy (PCID)ini mengemukakan bahwa komunitas Islam di Filipina berpusat di Pulau Mindanao. Yakni, komunitas Moro.

Akibat marjinalisasi itu, Mindanao termasuk propinsi dengan indeks perkembangan SDM paling rendah di antara sepuluh propinsi yang ada di Filipina. Ini pertanda jika kualitas SDM penduduk Mindanao buruk.

Kaum Moro juga kurang terlibat dalam soal partisipasi politik. Pandangan mereka sinis, seperti tampak dalam tanggapan mereka soal pemilu. “Menurut mereka bukan pemilu (election), tetapi seleksi elit pejabat (selection),” tuturnya.

Maksudnya, pemilu bukan lagi kompetisi antar partai untuk mendulang suara, tetapi seleksi pejabat dari partai penguasa saja untuk menempati pos-pos tertentu.

Kedudukannya sebagai minoritas, yang berbeda dengan mayoritas, makin teguh ketika pandangan demokrasi kalangan Islam Filipina berbeda dengan pandangan arus utama. “Buat mereka kedaulatan ada di tangan Tuhan,” rinci Amina.

Bila demokrasi diidentikkan dengan kekuasaan mayoritas, bagi kaum Moro, demokrasi di Filipina tak lebih dari kekuasaan mayoritas Kristen. “Kesamaan di muka hukum di dalam demokrasi, menurut mereka, tidak berlaku bagi kaum minoritas dan orang miskin,” tambahnya.

Identitas Moro dan Islam yang terancam—antara lain akibat perbedaan persepsi dengan mayoritas—dan posisi ekonomi yang marginal kerap menimbulkan pemberontakan di Mindanao. “Pemberontakan ini juga dikarenakan mereka lemah dan perpolitikan dan lemah dalam harapan terhadap pemerintahan, yang sedang berkuasa” tandas Amina.

Mereka yang memberontak dibagi oleh Amina ke dalam dua kategori. “Pertama, kelompok pembebasan. Ada MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) dan MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front),” bebernya.

Kelompok kedua adalah kelompok teroris yang akrab dengan cara-cara kekerasan. Yakni kelompok Abu Sayyaf dan dan kelompok RMS (Rajah Solaiman Movement).

Berbagai upaya telah ditempuh oleh pemerintah untuk mengatasi pemberontakan ini, mulai dari cara damai sampai kekerasan gaya militer. Lembaganya, PCID, turut serta mengatasi masalah dengan berbagai program.

Misalnya, penerbitan the Moro Times sebagai sisipan dalam The Manila Times, pemberdayaan ulama lokal Moro untuk memperkuat kapasitas mereka sebagai agamawan, dan penyelenggaraan serangkaian dialog dengan isu-isu yang relevan terhadap pencarian perdamaian, kemajuan, dan demokrasi bagi Muslim Mindanao.

“Ini kami lakukan karena kami percaya bahwa Moro yang damai dan berkembang hanya akan tercapai melalui partisipasi demokrasi yang berarti,” tambahnya.

Akan tetapi, kini Presiden Gloria Macapagal Arroyo lebih menempuh cara milter, karena ia dekat sekaligus ditopang kekuasaannya oleh kalangan militer setempat. Walhasil, Pulau Minadano terus bergolak. Karena itu, ketika ditanya oleh seorang peserta, tentang halangan terberat perdamaian antara kelompok-kelompok tersebut di Filipina, Amina menjawab tegas, “Arroyo”.

“Menjadi muslim di negara sekuler adalah sesuatu yang tidak bertentangan (not incompatible),” jawab Amina lagi ketika ditanyai peserta yang lain soal kemungkinan negara mayoritas muslim, seperti Indonesia, menjadi sebuah negara sekuler.

Bila kalangan Islam Filipina merasa dipinggirkan oleh dominasi kaum Kristen, Asghar menyatakan hal itu tidak terjadi di India. “India pernah dikuasai oleh imperium Muslim untuk beberapa dekade,” jelas ketua Centre for Study of Society and Secularism yang berpusat di Mumbai itu. Imperium yang dimaksud adalah kerajaan Mongol Islam.

Namun demikian, bukan berarti penduduk India Muslim mengalami nasib yang lebih baik. “Meskipun jumlah Muslim di India mencapai 40% dari total penduduk India, hanya 3-4% saja yang memiliki jabatan dalam pemerintahan,” rinci Asghar. Penulis buku “Islam dan Teologi Pembebasan ” itu juga menyatakan bahwa Muslim di India banyak yang miskin dan buta huruf.

Asghar menambahkan minoritas dilindungi pemerintahan India, antara lain dengan menjamin kebebasan beragama. “Secara konstitusional itu ada, tetapi ada banyak problem dalam prakteknya,” tambahnya.

Negara sekuler juga menghadapi persoalan dengan mayoritas sebagaimana dialami oleh negara yang tidak sekuler. “Itu adalah realisme mayoritas (majority realism),” sebutnya.

Realisme mayoritas ini berbentuk agama mayoritas, partai mayoritas, dan seterusnya, yang cenderung meminggirkan minoritas. “Kita harus lawan itu,” imbuhnya.

Realisme mayoritas juga menumbuhkan identitas tunggal pada diri seseorang, misalnya “identitas saya satu-satunya adalah seorang Muslim” atau “identitas saya satu-satunya adalah saya anggota partai Kongres”. Kata Asghar, “Identitas tunggal itu sebuah problem bagi iklim demokrasi”. Ia dapat menimbulkan konflik dan kekerasan sementara semangat demokrasi hanya bisa dijalankan melalui dialog tanpa kekerasan.

Sebagai pegiat sekuarisme di Mumbai, Asghar teguh menolak bentuk negara Islam sebab sifatnya membahayakan. “Di banyak negara Islam, penguasa menyingkirkan kelompok Islam minoritas,” jelas Asghar mengenai pendapatnya itu. Di Arab Saudi, kelompok Wahabi yang mayoritas menyingkirkan kelompok Islam lain yang tidak sepaham.

Asghar menyatakan bahwa dirinya menjadi Muslim adalah karena hatinya, bukan karena negaranya berbentuk negara Islam. “Islam adalah keyakinan, bukan perkara politik,” pungkasnya menutup diskusi yang berakhir malam hari itu. [WCK, NN]

2008-08-26T11:15:00.000-07:00

Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam

Author:
Greg Barton
Publisher:
University of New South Wales Press (UNSW Press), August 2004, Sidney
ISBN: 0-86840-759-3
Softback,
118 pages

Reviewed by Gary LaMoshi*
Despite more than 225 dead in three bomb attacks attributed to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorists and thousands more killed in anti-Christian jihad in the Malukus and central Sulawesi since 1999, Indonesia continues to dismiss the influence of radical Islam. Conventional wisdom contends that extremists enjoy support from only a tiny minority in the world's largest predominantly Muslim nation. Yet Indonesia 's mainstream political and religious leaders more frequently embrace these alleged fringe groups than condemn and isolate them, lending extremism respectability and acceptance as the body count rises.

Given that contradiction, examining Islam in Indonesia often raises more questions than it answers. Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam presents a clear-eyed analysis of Islam's involvement in Indonesian politics and terrorism, avoiding simple generalizations as Indonesia emerges from decades of authoritarian rule under former president Suharto that suppressed Islam as a potential threat to the New Order's political control.

Author Greg Barton of Australia 's Deakin University , an expert on modern Islamic intellectual currents, explains in this concise volume major trends in Muslim thought in simple language that lay people can understand. The theology can be somewhat confusing: what many call fundamentalists are more rightly labeled modernists, their thinking growing out of Wahhabism from Saudi Arabia , which funds Indonesian radicals and seeks to scour impurities from Islam and return to sixth-century practices. Liberals or traditionalists endorse a syncretic Islam that appends elements of Sufi mysticism and local, traditional influences.

Gun-intended consequences?
Throughout this book, Barton acknowledges links between terrorism and the Indonesian armed forces that most experts sweep under the rug. Jemaah Islamiyah was born as an unintended consequence of Indonesian military plots against Muslim radicals in the 1970s. JI attacks starting with the Christmas Eve 2000 bombings across the archipelago may, in turn, be unintended consequences of the military's sponsorship of anti-Christian jihad in the Malukus and central Sulawesi

Supplementing his academic qualifications, Barton was a live-in biographer for former Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid, holding a ringside seat to observe the role of Islam in Indonesia 's reform era. Wahid, a nearly blind, liberal Muslim cleric widely known as Gus Dur, became president in 1999 as a compromise candidate with Islamist support. (Barton defines Islamists as transforming Islam into a political ideology and emphasizing the differences between Muslims and others, whereas liberals support acceptance and tolerance.) Gus Dur was ousted in 2001 after Islamists realized that he didn't share their agenda, illustrating the split between Islamic and Islamist politics.

In Indonesia's Struggle Barton shows how religion stood at the center of Indonesian politics even before independence. The original draft of the 1945 constitution included the Jakarta Charter, obliging Muslims to follow Sharia, Islamic law. Nationalists removed that section to create a more secular state, inspiring Islamist political and even armed opposition that didn't end until the military takeover in 1965. In the first national elections in 1955, Islamic parties received nearly 40% of the votes. After more than three decades of repression, Islamic parties received similar percentages in the 1999 and 2004 national elections, with Islamists showing growing strength in the most recent balloting.

Islamist gains may owe to their former forbidden-fruit status; the two hottest categories in Indonesian mass culture are Islam and sex, both suppressed under Suharto (though still widely practiced). Barton cautions against ignoring radical Islamist roots of the fast growing Prosperous Justice Party, whose chairman is a speaker of the legislature. But Barton echoes other Western critics when he discounts the appeal of Islamists as political reformers when other choices carry New Order connections. More curiously, Barton fails to address why the political establishment fears Gus Dur enough to create a blatantly discriminatory excuse - a vision test requirement - to bar him from the 2004 presidential race without worrying about backlash from his supporters while fearing negative reaction if they condemn radical Islamists.

The enduring strength of Islamists is an uncomfortable fact for Indonesia 's secular politicians and concerned Westerners to face. But liberals need to recognize that religion is a staple of Indonesian political life just as Indonesians need to understand that they're the ones who suffer from Islamist terrorism in their country. Barton argues convincingly that it's not public sympathy for radical Islamists that endangers Indonesia but political Islamists' denial of jihadi Islamist violence.

Two roads converged …
Political Islamists support the introduction of Sharia by democratic means, while jihadi Islamists advocate theocracy and are willing to use violence to get it. Barton observes that Indonesia 's political and jihadi Islamists are converging, with politicians' embrace of jihadis moving violent extremists into the mainstream. He warns that the convergence could lead Indonesia to resemble Pakistan , where an Islamist minority has imposed its views on a secular majority. At the focal point of Indonesia 's convergence, Barton finds the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI) and its founder Abu Bakar Ba'asyir.

A fervent preacher with a flair for public relations, Ba'asyir currently is standing trial for a second time on charges that he's the leader of JI. Ba'asyir 's botched first trial, according to Barton, reversed the post-Bali bombing current of public support for a crackdown on jihadi Islamists, confirming Islamist propaganda that the "war on terror" is a war on Islam and demonstrating how Western support for anti-terrorism measures can be counterproductive.

Barton points out that, in the war for Indonesia 's soul, the Islamists are better equipped and more aggressive than liberal Muslims. That's hardly surprising: zealots who see the world in black and white tend to be more fanatical than those who detect nuance and accept different views. Barton's straightforward book reveals where radical Islam stands in this nation with key strategic geopolitical and theological-political roles, placing Islamists closer to Indonesia 's center than most choose to believe.

2008-08-26T11:07:00.000-07:00

Map of Islamic Movements and Thought in Indonesia: The Future of Indonesian Islam

By Ahmad Suaedy*
Speaking about Islamic movements and thought can not really be separated from observations of current political powers and momentums, both on the national and the local scale. 2008 is a year in which the political process is incredibly intensive in facing the most crucial moment of Indonesia’s journey to democracy, namely the parliamentary and presidential elections, both of which are to be held in 2009.

The result of these two general elections, if they can, and hopefully do, actually happen, will determine not only the direction and model of democracy that has been built since the fall of the New Order, but also the philosophical orientation and the meaning of freedom for the people of Indonesia themselves. The struggle and competition is really a struggle between Islamic powers themselves; and there is no political struggle or competition which fails to incorporate Islamic elements.

Thus, Islam is now in the middle of the competitive arena itself, whether as an action or ideological base, therefore being offered as an alternative to the type of state and society currently in place; whether as a political commodity aimed at power and attainment of universal support; or whether as an ideal ambition which dreams of an ideal form of authentic integration of Islam and Indonesians.

***

Mark Woodward (2001), for example, categorized the Islamic response to the post New Order changes into five groups. Woodward’s categorization views things from the point of doctrine and social roots within the Muslim society of Indonesia, both old and new.

First, indigenized Islam. Indigenized Islam is an expression of Islam with local characteristics: formally they claim to be Muslim, but they usually follow local rituals rather than orthodox Islam. This characteristic parallels with what Clifford Geertz calls ‘abangan’ Islam in the Javanese context. In religious and political relations, it is given that they think secularly and are reluctant to bring religious issues to the realm of the state, and vice versa.

Second, the traditional Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU is the largest Sunni adherent in Indonesia and is considered to have individual expression, because it has special features not possessed by other groups, including a strong base in pesantren and villages, a unique teacher-student relationship, and characteristic of strong accommodation for local Islamic expression so long as it does not conflict with Islamic belief. NU apparently does not try to force “Arabism” into everyday Islamic life.

Third, modern Islam. This Islam is mostly based on Muhammadiyah, the second largest organization after Nahdlatul Ulama. It is based on social service such as education and health care. It introduces ideas of modernization into classical understandings. It, for example, rejects local expression and is more likely to embrace puritanical expressions which feature “Arabism”.

Fourth, Islamism. This movement has recently only brought Arabism and conservatism, but also contains within it the paradigm of Arab-Islam ideology. It is no surprise that jihad and the application of Islamic law are a primary characteristic of this group. This group has also not been shy in forming paramilitary Islamic ranks to oppose anyone or thing identified as an enemy of Islam by their definition.

Fifth, neo-modern Islam. This group is characterized more by intellectual movement and critique of established Islamic doctrine. It originates from a variety of groups, including both traditional and modern circles. Members are found within a variety of NGOs and research institutions, Islamic universities and certain traditional Muslim leaders. They also search for new interpretations of various Islamic doctrines based on social realities, and use new methods and philosophies such as hermeneutics.

Meanwhile, Peter G Riddel (2002) divides post New Order Islamic groups into four categories: modernist, traditionalist, neo-modernist, and Islamist. Generally speaking, Riddel agrees with each of the above definitions but ignores one of Woodward’s categories – indigenized Islam. For Riddel, each possess their own unique characteristics in dealing with crucial issues in the initial years after the first general elections (1999) following the fall of the New Order. These issues include returning to the Jakarta Charter, the Malacca crisis, opening trade relations with Israel, an Indonesian federation, the place of minorities in the Indonesian state system, female presidents, and newly formed political parties.

***

Despite the difference in categories of these two academics, I agree that there are four Islamic bases of power in the lead up to the 2009 elections, which are representative of Islamic thought and movements. Although comprehensively explaining each of these powers is quite a complicated process, I wish to give a basic understanding by examining the central symbols and primary characteristics of thought, movement and idealization as well as the supporters of these groups.

First, the power of Megawati with her party – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P). PDI-P is considered a nationalist party which, under the traditional political map of the Old and New Orders, was in confrontation with Islamic politics and parties. I believe PDI-P can no longer be seen as a nationalist party vis a vis Islam. PDI-P, with Megawati as its symbol, is a party supported by a large number of Muslims.

In terms of PDI-P’s Islamic characteristics, they hold that Islam is not a basis for action and they virtually have no Islamic intellectual basis. It is a given that they believe religion is separate from politics. This understanding comes not only from western secular understandings, but also from Indonesian, particularly Javanese, culture itself - what Woodward calls indigenized Islam.

Yet arguably this group will experience difficulties in responding to the demands of other Islamic groups, supposing they demand something specific, because PDI-P does not have an intellectual Islamic basis with which to respond. Thus, this group is more likely to use their power to answer such demands, than argumentative reasoning. Consequently, they will rely on the power of negotiation. If negotiation fails and their power is upset, then they will choose to maintain their power by accommodating the demands, no matter what the principals of the demands may be.

Second, Golkar. We do not yet know who is the central figure of this party, who has roots extending back to Soeharto’s regime. Yet we can expect that Golkar’s presidential candidate will come from a modern or modernist form of Islam – from the last academic category. Pragmatism is its trait. Whatever the majority demands are from Golkar’s members or society, they will become the reference upon which decisions are made, so long as the party continues to obtain or maintain power.

This party has many intellectuals, including Muslim intellectuals, but its orientation is highly dependent on its grip on power. This can be seen in its orientations which differ from one region to another, depending on the demands of the local Muslim majority. Thus, similar to the first group, negotiation is the primary weapon of this party, even in the most important of matters.

Third, Gus Dur’s party. From the point of view of the party, Gus Dur’s party is not as big as the two parties above. However support for his thought and actions is spread across almost every group and power, except for those groups which are truly Islamist and which reject ideas of pluralism and diversity, and are against tolerance.

Many people acknowledge the truth behind Gus Dur’s thoughts and actions, although there are also many who are scared and worried about following his ideals because he often ignores material and political profits, and does not care about his self image for the sake of maintaining his principles. These characteristics have, besides a high intellectual Islamic basis, a very strong principal of ‘Indonesian-ness’. Without meaning to exaggerate, it is perhaps this tradition, taken from the history of his thoughts and actions, which is most authentic in Indonesian Islam. It is based on the archipelago’s traditional Islamic views, which has, since early Islamic history, been well known as a tradition that continues to develop and adapt.

In the hands of this group, Islam continues to develop without leaving its intrinsic and original values. This group has difficulty compromising on Indonesia-Islam issues: there is, within it, elements of respect for traditions both present and developing within society, as well as for intrinsic citizenship rights, such as the right to have a religion or faith, and the right to lead a reasonably comfortable life. This group is characteristically very ideal, yet has difficulty winning in a time which is highly pragmatic and full of short cuts.

In terms of economy, if we may reflect on Gus Dur’s presidency, Gus Dur was perhaps not an anti neo-liberal man, but rather tended to want to build new economic powers, such as the India-China-Indonesia axis for the independence of the people in these countries, without creating an excessively strained situation.

Fourth, SBY’s party. Because SBY is currently in power, it is easer to examine him. From his actions as president it can easily be seen that in terms of religion he represents the right, or the Islamist stream, and is the most transparent neoliberal agent in terms of economics. There is no truth to the fact that SBY religiously follows the anti-tolerance and anti-pluralism MUI stream, or to the fact that he appointed KH Ma’ruf Amin, the most vocal anti-pluralism and anti-deviant sects spokesperson, as member of the Presidential Advisory Council for the field of religion.

The Ahmadiyah case and the bloody Monas Tragedy show the stance from which SBY’s policies are derived. The Three Ministers’ Joint Decree on Ahmadiyah, for example, was issued when the presidential palace was surrounded by supporters of Rizieq Shihab, the general head of FPI, which is against pluralism and tolerance. It could be said that in this case, SBY bent under the demands of Rizieq and Munarman (Commander of the Islamic Brigade Command). This occurred because SBY’s initial circle of power consisted of Islamic parties such as PKS, PBB, and PD. These two former parties are known as militant Islamic parties, while PD does not have enough intellectual power to contest the other two parties.

During SBY’s government, on the other hand, in terms of the economy, while figures show that the macro economy is quite stable because it is supported by provisional international funds, the national economic foundation has collapsed. Look no further than the decrease in petroleum produce, electricity supplies, gas supplies, cooking oil and refined oil within the country. Never before have people been seen lining up for food, refined oil, and cooking oil, or with such poor nutrition as they now are. Yet at the same time, a minister, also an entrepreneur in collaboration with SBY, became the richest man in Southeast Asia for the first time in Indonesian history.

Consequently, inter-religious violence which has never been handled normally, as well as care for and protection of Islamist groups, in practice, I believe, represents this governments’ strategy to squeeze support from the Islamists for the 2009 elections. Similarly, the short tense periods that deviant sects, including Ahmadiyah, experience, are for no purpose other than to milk Islamic sentiment for the same reason. Thus SBY, with the power of his supporters, is a representation of right-winged Islam. So do not be surprised if the tension is nurtured until the 2009 general elections.

***

Considering this matter, there are several issues to reflect on. First, the spreading government interference in inter-religious relations which is a part of their strategy to gain support. It is estimated that this phenomena will continue to develop, to its complete infiltration of laws, and government regulations, at the local and central levels. I hope it does not touch the constitution, although this can not be disregarded as a possibility. Its culmination will be the domination of specific groups, and discrimination of other groups, at the most fundamental level: the constitution and the law.

Second, poverty and queues. These two words will continue to be reciprocally connected for as long as there is no significant change in economic strategy, and other words may be added, such as death, and poor nutrition. Foreign control of natural resources will be directly followed by efficiency through mechanical regeneration, to the neglect of the human workforce. What then occurs is widespread unemployment. The progression is easy to predict: poverty, queuing, poor nutrition and even death.

Third, control of natural resources. It seems that right from the beginning the economic orientation of this government has followed the major world economic trend - neoliberalism. At some future point in time Indonesia may not have any natural resources under their own management, but rather all will be “given” to foreign capital, with long contracts and efficient management to quickly reel in profits.

Fourth, Islamist movements. The current government, especially SBY, is not just suspected of having a strong understanding in line with Islamist understandings and also with the primary parties mentioned above, but he also does not have sufficient understanding of Islam and Islamic movements. So that anything that benefits him, he will take, even concerning principal rights such as the right to religion and faith. If there is no courage to change this current government orientation towards Islamist movements, then these movements will only further permeate state and government bodies.

***

I will not suggest that PMII follow a certain trend, or even create a new one. But considering PMII’s commitment to the people as an organization based on grassroots trends, and PMII’s Indonesia-Islam vision, perhaps this has to become a major consideration. It seems that only with this method will Indonesian Islam exist to face the future.
Thank you.

Kampung Rambutan, July 13, 2008.

*The author is the Executive Director of the Wahid Institute.
** This working paper was submitted in the Advanced Cadre Training for the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PKL-PMII) in Pondok Cabe, Cireundeu, Tangerang, Banten, Sunday, July 13, 2008.

2008-08-26T10:50:00.000-07:00

Muhammad: Prophet and Politician

Oleh: Ulil Abshar-Abdalla

I am, here, using simple terminology. I want to call Muhammad a prophet and a politician as well. In his 23 year career, Muhammad showed a moral reformation through his prophetic career, and led a social and political reformation in Medina.

This article was published in the daily Media Indonesia, Tuesday 4^th May 2004

The advantage of Islam as a religion is this: unlike Christianity, Islam found ‘Constantine” within itself. Muhammad was not merely a prophet, but also a figure who struggled hard to bring his teaching down to earth so that it would not be only a ‘white cloud’ drifting in the air.

In Christianity, Jesus had three years to convey his message. Afterward, Jesus came into conflict with the ‘political structure’ of the great Roman Empire and was ultimately crucified.

At that time, Christianity was exactly like plants that sprout after being cut. If Constantine the Great had not embraced Christianity in the third century and made it a religion of the state, what would have happened to this religion that now has the most disciples in the world. Without ‘political’ power, would this religion have progressed rapidly and become a universal religion? We’ll never know.

Islam, in sloppy comparison, is a case of Muhammad being Jesus and Constantine at once. Compare the history of Jesus and Muhammad. The years of Muhammad’s life in Mecca (610 AD when Muhammad attained first revelation up to 622 AD when he migrated to Medina) can be seen as the period of ‘The Sermon on the Mount’, the period when the prophet propagated his teachings. This period went on for 13 years. The Medina period, from 622 AD up to 632 AD when he died, was the period of political and social institutionalization. I want to call it the ‘Constantine period’.

An important phase which is symbolically considered as reflecting the mission of Muhammad is his meditation in a cave outside Mecca. After he attained the revelation in 610 AD, in spite of staying in the cave, enjoying solitary meditation, and staying away from society, he returned to the city to propagate the teachings, and directed a ‘social transformation’.

In Islam there is a difference between a Nabi (prophet) and a Rasul (messenger). A Nabi is the one who attained revelation, and who is not required to disseminate it to society. While a Rasul, on the contrary, attained revelation and had to propagate it. Muhammad was both a Nabi (prophet) as well as a Rasul (messenger).

One of the advantages of the Prophet was that he did not live in the Roman or in the Sassanian empires in Persia. This is a historical advantage which Christianity did not posses. Christianity was born in the Roman Empire and within the stable local ‘religious power’ of Judaism. Islam, on the contrary, was born within –let’s say— a ‘terra incognita,’ vacant space with no power.

Mecca, where Muhammad was born and started his mission, was a distant city from the Roman and Persian Empires. Using Ben Anderson’s analysis about the concept of political rule in Java, I think what has been conveyed by Anderson is typical of pre-modern kingdoms in which power is declining which was the condition at that time. The influence of both great empires of the day was not great in Mecca. This condition benefited the new religion and community developed by the Prophet. If Islam had appeared in Turkey, the journey of this religion would have been different.

An Egyptian scholar, Ali Abdul Raziq, in his controversial message, al-Islam wa Ushul al-Hukm (Islam and principles of governance), conveyed that Muhammad was only a prophet and a messenger, not a leader of the state. Although I agree with his objective of writing this message – to repudiate the claim of Muslims to reestablish the caliphate, his illustration of Muhammad is unfair. Muhammad was truly a messenger, but he was also leader of a real community which was the ‘embryo’ of a state in Medina.

Therefore, it is acceptable for modern Muslim intellectuals to search for inspiration for managing modern society through the example of the Prophet in Medina. One policy of Muhammad’s (‘Abqariyyat Muhammad), was to initiate a ‘political contract’ between the Muslim community and other social groups in Medina. In Islamic history, this contract is known as ‘Mitsaq al-Madinah’ or the Medina Concord or Charter. An Egyptian writer, Muhammad Husen Haikal, in Hayat Muhammad (The Life of Muhammad), considers this as a ‘watsiqah siyasiyyah’ or political document guaranteeing the freedom of faith, freedom of opinion, the protection of the country, the right to live, and the right to own property.

I agree that Medina was an embryo state. The Prophet was the leader. As a politician leading a state, he succeeded in establishing the first political entity in Arabia. In that new entity, Arab society from various tribes and clans was united: a great achievement which never been achieved by an Arab leader before Muhammad. Like Constantine, the Prophet made Islam a ‘cement of civilization’ tying Arab and later non Arabs together.

What I don’t agree with is whether the Prophet’s entire policy in Medina must be copied for the current time because the example of the Prophet in Medina belonged to a specific social and historical context.

The model of Medina can be an inspiration to search for forms of management of Muslim society, but it is not a ‘blueprint’ which must be copied in detail. Muslim society must formulate new models in accordance with current challenges.

Allahumma shalli ‘ala sayyidina Muhammad wa ‘ala ali Sayyidina Muhammad.***

2008-08-26T10:47:00.001-07:00

A “Muslim” Note on John Shelby Spong

Oleh: Ulil Abshar-Abdalla

In the journey toward the truth, people tend to take the easy tack. The easiest way is to treat religion as an heirloom inherited from our ancient predecessors; to treat religion as a set of doctrines that have clear-cut boundaries or, more precisely, boundary (in a singular form). The easiest way to be in the way of being “religionist” is to follow the well-trodden path of the predecessors without daring to ask or challenge. To question what has been laid down as doctrines by our pious predecessors is tantamount to an act of heresy.

John Shelby Spong is one of my favorite theologians. All of his works have stuffed my private library, including my favorite, Why Christianity Must Change or Die. Irrespective of the fact that the message contained in the book is addressed toward Christians, but it speaks very well to the very problem faced by Muslims nowadays.

If we swap the word “Christianity” in the above title with “Islam”, the message of the book is still relevant. Yes, both Islam and Christianity are faced with the same problem, i.e. the problem of literalistic reading of the Scripture. Sharing Spong in what he said in this book, there are myriad doctrines both in Islam and Christianity that we who live in twenty first century can no longer believe in without being subject to reinterpretation.

For instance, I can no longer believe in the doctrine that Islam is the sole path toward salvation, that Islam is the only religion that embodies the Divine Truth. The exclusivist claim such as that is widely found in any religion, particularly among the family of Semitic religions.

Paul Knitter calls this phenomenon as a “claim of uniqueness”. Almost all religions pride itself to be the unique path toward the truth, rendering other faiths or religions as spurious or less capable of guiding people to the salvation.

Divine truth, as one mystic aptly describes it, is like a broken mirror with its pieces spread here and there. Each religion is like one piece that mirrors small part of the Truth. He or she who is out to seek the Whole Truth has to put hold on all pieces—an undertaking that is hardly capable of being accomplished by a single person. Divine Truth is beyond the reach of us the mortal human beings.

To think that one piece of broken mirror is the whole mirror is tantamount to arrogance, or takabbur.

Spong can no longer uphold such arrogant belief. He describes himself as a man who is strolling along the path of quest, seeking the truth. All believers, irrespective of their faith, are fellow seekers. Seeking is a process with no foreseeable end. I share Spong this vision of religion as a process of seeking truth without end.

Spong also describes himself as a “believer in exile”.

People like Spong is of different breed. He refutes to believe the way ordinary people who are content with well-defined doctrines believe. He chooses the harder way: to embark on an un-ending process of quest.

That is why he describes himself as a believer in exile. He breaks the rank with his fellow Christians who prefer the easiest way of being Christian. He is still a believing man, yet he is exiled and banished from his home of “birth”.

This is what I would like to call “liberal faith”, a faith that liberates us from the shackle of inherited set of doctrines believed to be a lasting truth for every time and place. The truth that many religionists try to bury deep beneath the carpet is that there is a wide hiatus between what is claimed to be a religious doctrine and teaching and the real and ever-changing situation lived by its believers.

All thinking person would understand by the simplest common sense that many claimed to be divine teaching is closely correlated with a concrete situation lived by people of the yore.

Take for instance the ruling claimed by many Muslims to be an eternal truth because it is revealed by All-Knowing God, i.e. the teaching related to how women should dress in front of men. This is what is called hijab or jilbab in popular Muslim parlance.

According to many Muslim scholars, women are obliged to cover their whole body except their face and arm. Some other scholars even go further as to say that the face of women is also un-exposable; therefore it has to be entirely covered. Hence the practice called burqa, a woman’s outfit that covers her entire body including her face such as we see practiced widely in Afghanistan.

It is true that in Quran, there are verses that indicate toward that effect. Or precisely speaking, women are required by Quran to let their dress hanging loosely as to cover their bosom (or cleavage?) so that they are not subject to harassment—a practice that Quran indicated to have been rampant among Arab society during the life of the Prophet.

I do not believe that covering the entire women’s body is a rule Muslim has to adhere to in all situations, and in all times. First of all, the divine rule that exhorts women to have their bosom covered is correlated with the context in which women are subject to men’s harassment in the Arab society of Prophet’s time. Secondly, the essence of Islamic teaching on dress is not how women practically should cover their body, but rather how they dress themselves decently so that they are not subject to social harassment.

Hijab or jilbab is just a practical example of how women during the life of Prophet should dress in a way that is commensurate with their dignity as human being. Dressing is a cultural practice that is always changing over time along the development of human civilization. The concept of decency is not a monolithic and fixed notion that applies in all societies.

Therefore, I do not believe that Islamic rule on jilbab is meant to be an eternal rule that is applicable permanently. There are many other things in religion, including Islam, which needs to be refreshed and read with a “new eye”.

To lock religion up in an antique vessel and shield it away from change and revisiting is, to me, an act of suicide. There are only two options for any religion as Spong rightly asserts: either to change, or die!

Let me end by quoting some lines from Spong as follow:

Institutional Christianity seems fearful of inquiry, fearful of freedom, fearful of knowledge—indeed, fearful of anything except its own repetitious propaganda, which has its own origins in a world that none of us any longer inhabits.

Please, don’t be misled by the word “Christianity” in the above citation. You can put “Islam” in its place, and yet the whole sentence still makes a full sense.[]

2008-08-26T10:30:00.001-07:00

Food businesses lack halal certificates
Tuesday, August 26, 2008 13:56:22

Palembang, NU Online
Authorities in South Sumatra have stepped up supervision on halal products (permissible under Islamic law) ahead of the Ramadan fasting month, commencing early September.

"However, the outcome was astounding, as only six out of 1,552 companies, registered as active in the food and beverage industry in 15 regencies and municipalities in the province, have obtained halal certification, as of August this year," said the head of the South Sumatra chapter of the Institute for the Study on Food, Medicine and Cosmetics of the Indonesia Ulema Council (LPPOM-MUI), Nazaruddin Ilyas, in Palembang on Thursday.

He added that this situation prevailed despite the presence of LPPOM-MUI in the province since 2007.

The limited number of businesses applying for halal certificates for their products was attributed to various bureaucratic snags and the absence of a provincial ordinance, not to mention the obstacles faced in coordinating with the Food and Drug Agency at the provincial health office, despite repeated attempts to do so.

"Other factors include lack of awareness and limited funds on the part of businessmen, thus creating difficulties for LPPOM-MUI in issuing the certificates," said Nazaruddin as quoted by The Jakarta Post.

He urged businesses -- small, medium or large-scale -- involved in the food sector to immediately apply for halal certificates for their products, especially ahead of Ramadan, because the existence on the market of many food products without halal labels has stirred public anxiety.

"The food producers should have the sense and initiative to obtain the halal label, especially nearing Ramadan, because their food products are mainly consumed by Muslims," said Nazaruddin.

According to him, a halal label for a food item costs around Rp 720,000 (US$80.00) to obtain and is valid for six months. It is extendable every six months.

"Those found with expired halal certificates can face up to five years in prison and be fined up to Rp 1 billion," said Nazaruddin.

He has urged the provincial administration to issue a legal umbrella in the form of an ordinance. His office has submitted a draft bylaw to the governor but it has not yet been deliberated at the legislature.

"We only refer to the law on consumers' protection so far. If there was an ordinance we would be able to conduct random inspections and slap on stiff penalties for non compliance," he said.

Head of Small and Medium Enterprises division at the South Sumatra Industry and Trade Office Jani Laily said her office had repeatedly extended the call by LPPOM-MUI to food producers.

The small number of halal certificates being issued, according to Jani, is due to the high cost of applications, as well as the increase in fuel prices.

"We have repeatedly publicized this, but not every businessman can afford to apply for a label due to the high cost of getting one and the increase in fuel prices," she said. (dar)

Satu Gol Sheva di Chelsea = Rp 85,5 M

2008-08-26T10:24:00.000-07:00

London - Andriy Shevchenko mungkin telah memecahkan rekor dengan mencetak gol termahal di dunia. Selama di Chelsea, satu gol yang dia lesakkan bernilai Rp 85,5 miliar.

Jumlah tersebut didapat dari total uang uang harus dikeluarkan Chelsea untuk membelinya dari AC Milan serta membawar gaji bulanan striker Ukraina itu. Hasil yang didapat kemudian dibagi dengan total gol yang disumbangkan Sheva di Premiership selama dua musim.

Untuk memboyongnya dari AC Milan dua tahun lalu, Chelsea harus menggelontorkan dana sebesar 30,8 juta poundsterling (sekitar Rp 526,8 miliar), sebuah rekor pembelian termahal oleh klub Premiership. Sementara untuk bayaran perminggunya, selama 27 bulan kas The Blues tersedot hingga 14,82 juta poundsterling (Rp 253,5 miliar).

Total dana yang dikeluarkan Roman Abramovich untuk membayar Sheva sejak dia datang hingga akhirnya dipinjamkan ke Milan adalah 45,62 juta poundsterling (Rp 780,3 miliar). Sementara jumlah gol yang disumbangkan mantan Pemain Terbaik Eropa itu di Liga Inggris saja hanya sembilan.

Jadilah masing-masing gol yang dibuat Sheva berharga Rp 85,5 miliar (780,3 miliar : 9 gol).

Jumlah tersebut jelas sangat fantastis, bahkan untuk standar Chelsea yang terkenal jor-joran jika membeli dan menawari gaji pemain. Demikian diberitakan TheSun. ( din / roz )

Early life and career

2008-08-26T10:21:00.000-07:00

Tankian was born on August 21, 1967, in Beirut, Lebanon. He and his family immigrated to Los Angeles in 1975^[1]. In Beirut, Tankian took flute lessons as a young child. He earned a degree in Marketing and Business from California State University, Northridge^[2] and started his own software company before beginning his music career^[1]. In 1993, he founded his first rock band, Soil (not to be confused with SOiL) with Daron Malakian, Domingo Laranio, Dave Hakopyan, and later, Shavo Odadjian. Two years later, in 1995, after one supposed jam session recording and one live show, Dave and Domingo left. Shavo (who went on to become the bass player) brought in drummer Andy Khachaturian. The four of them then named themselves System of a Down.

During System of a Down's days, he was the vocalist in other bands for certain songs such as Mushroom Cult by Dog Fashion Disco and lent his vocals to the song Mein by Deftones. He produced "Enter the Chicken" by Buckethead, and provided vocals to the Buckethead songs We Are One, Coma, and Waiting Here. With Serjical Strike Records, he endeavours to offer those musicians often ignored by the mainstream a possibility to release their music and be heard. The first release of Tankian's new label was Serart, a project consisting of Tankian himself, and Arto Tunçboyacıyan, an Armenian friend of Tankian's.

He originally began System of a Down to voice his views on politics, but felt that the band was not getting the message across. However, contrary to popular belief he stated in a recent interview that he did not leave the band and they have not split up, but decided to embark upon a solo career to open upon his own personal view on music to get his word out on his opinion of President Bush's choice on going to war with Iraq.

More recently, he sang with Les Rita Mitsouko on the song "Terminal Beauty". Also, he sang with the band Fair to Midland during a live improvisational version of their song "Walls of Jericho", from the album Fables from a Mayfly: What I Tell You Three Times Is True, which was a massive hit with fans. He often collaborates as well with his close friend, director Diran Noubar on various projects, including the voice-over of Noubar's "Armenia, a Country Under Blockade". Noubar played some guitar on Tankian's Elect the Dead album on the track "Saving Us" and directed the music video for "Baby".

Tankian is also very involved politically. Together with Tom Morello, he founded the organization Axis of Justice. Tankian has a secondary vacation cabin in New Zealand. There has been a misconception that he intends to stay in New Zealand until the Iraq War is over, but as stated in an interview, Tankian has no intention of doing so. He often speaks publicly against violence and injustice in the world.

Tankian is at work on a second album, due in 2009. It is said to be more of a jazz and orchestral based sound. A new song, "Sounds of War", has shown up in recent concert setlists, it has a jazz fusion style, it is unknown if it will be on the second record.

Tankian told The Pulse of Radio last week that the highlights of his last eight months on the road may soon be documented in a DVD featuring videos, live performances and behind-the-scenes footage.

Tankian is currently co-writing a musical with the American playwright Steven Sater. It is based on the Ancient Greek Tragedy Prometheus Bound. He stated that eight songs have been completed and that there will be a record.^[3]

In a recent interview with Czech TV, Tankian stated that he quit smoking about four or five months ago because it was time to do so.^[4] Tankian was recently in Finland and in an interview with a Finnish magazine he stated that he would be interested in representing Armenia in the Eurovision song contest.

Hina....!

2008-08-23T07:54:00.000-07:00

Di kala kegundahan ku semakin meradang, aku tak tahu harus menjadikan hidup ini apa. Usaha telah mendekati titik kulminasi. Entah jadi apa keringat yang selama ini aku peras hingga tetes terakhir. Dan tampaknya sudah hampir kering. Aku berharap akan ada yang teduhkan jalan ku, namun sampai aku melemah, mentari masih terlalu bebas menghujam tubuh ku.

Sepertinya terlalu jauh aku memusatkan pandangan ku. Pasir dan kerikil mencengkram kaki ku, seakan melarang ku untuk melanjutkan mimpi. Kapan aku bisa menghirup udara pagi, sementara ku rasakan selalu mentari di atas kepala ku. Sesekali aku menghela nafasku yang semakin pendek, namun sesekali pula aku membuang pandangan ku kearah yang tak pernah aku lihat selama ini.

Aku telah berusaha memberikan yang terbaik kepada mereka yang mengadahkan tangannya untuk sesekali meludahkan doa yang entah mereka menikmati doa itu atau tidak. yang ini adalah jalan yang gelap, yang ini adalah jalan yang lebih gelap, dan satu lagi jalan yang paling gelap diantara jalan-jallan yang lainnya.

Aku tersimpuh di hadapan kaktus-kaktus berduri, hingga aku tersadar aku telah menjadi segumpal darah kembali. Aku tak tahu rahim siapa tempat aku bersemayam kini. Yang aku tahu kini aku menjadi hampa, menjadi bukan siapa-siapa, aku hanya debu yang akan terhempas dengan sekali tiupan angin saja.

aku kembali hina.......!